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Review Article 
Distinguishing between ontology and ‘decolonisation as praxis’
Siseko H. Kumalo
Introduction
African Philosophical and Literary Possibilities: Re-reading the Canon (2020), edited by Aretha Phiri, is framed around 
the consideration of the decolonial question as it relates to these two disciplines, i.e., philosophy and literature 
(understood in the broader sense of literary theory). The editor suggests that in locating these two disciplines 
in conversation there is the possibility that the decolonial question might be illumined, a matter framed in the 
following ways: “[t]his [agential ability of philosophy as discipline to unpack the cumulative parts that give us 
African literature as a whole] demonstrates not just the limits of approaching African literature with a ‘philosoph-
ical intent,’ but also works to unsettle epistemological assumptions of Africa and African subjectivity” (Phiri xv). 
The treatment of decoloniality is infused in the implicit work of unsettling “epistemological assumptions of Africa 
and African subjectivity”, which is what gives the reader a central focus of ontology as it is treated in the book; a 
matter to which I will apply myself momentarily. 
The volume attempts to highlight the decolonial component, by way of considering the historicity of what 
has defined the debate on African literature(s). This consideration is done by way of treating, as example, “the 
efficacy of African literature written in English” (xii). Once more, the reader is directed to the implicit treatment 
of some of the decolonial questions, with one of these being the role and function of language. To frame language 
thusly is rooted in the thinking of Mazisi Kunene (30), when he maintains that “[…] the idea of language imposi-
tion as a strategy of power and political control must be kept in mind as a crucial political and social question”. He 
further argues that “[in] short, writers who write in a foreign language are already part of foreign institutions; to 
one extent or another, they have adopted foreign values and philosophical attitudes, and they variously seek to be 
a member of that culture” (32). The most poignant observation when it comes to language as a constitutive part of 
decolonial praxis is found when Kunene (32) asserts, ruminating on the instructions of his grandmother, that “[t]
his language [English] is responsible for the death of many of your Ancestors” (emphasis added). Phiri does not apply herself 
to this very complex function of language, whether it be in literature and literary theory or in the philosophical 
domain. I am pressing for said application, not in the substantive chapter, chapter seven—which the editor con-
tributes as part of the collective set of essays—but rather in the opening and framing text, the introduction, which 
should have addressed these questions systematically, specifically when the editor and the authors undertake 
such an enormous task of locating two disciplines in conversation with each other. 
Distinguishing between ontology and ‘decolonisation as praxis’
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The reader does, however, get a slight—again implicit—consideration of the matter (that is language as an 
inherent component of ontology) in the work of George Hull in chapter three. There is a glaring objection that 
can be levelled against Hull’s analysis, however, on the premise of ontological misrecognition(s). I will attend to 
this matter shortly when I take up the role and function of ontology in the decolonial mission that is constitutive 
of complex facets whose aims are clearly definable and discernible, if only the student of decolonial theory and 
decoloniality (understood doubly as the actual student in the lecture theatre and the intellectual who is engaged 
in the task of doing, teaching, and conducting research from and through a decolonial approach) were to disabuse 
themselves of the epistemic and intellectual arrogance that prevails in the South African academe, and learn any 
of the Indigenous languages of the region. What I am suggesting here is that the claim that decoloniality is inde-
finable, obscure, and elusive is nonsensical and works to maintain an epistemic hegemony predicated on a white 
supremacist logic in the knowledge economy of South Africa. I will not recycle the thinking of J. M. Coetzee here, 
as any self-respecting intellectual of Letters should apply themselves to his seminal treatise in an effort to under-
stand the dangers inherent in and constitutive of the erasures that make up modes of White Writing. Put differently, 
the reader of this collection is privy to these denials in the claim that asserts that the meaning of decoloniality and 
decolonisation is indiscernible in our context. This claim is not put in such direct format in the introduction, but 
is rather concealed cleverly when the editor takes up the question of Africanisation: a consideration that is itself 
concerning in the conflations and reductionist ways in which it reads the decolonial project in South Africa and 
on the continent, more generally. 
Conceptual conflations—Africanisation, transformation, and decolonisation 
While the book suggests that it applies itself to the decolonial question, its constitutive methodology is silent—in 
the most part—on questions that concern decoloniality. What I intend by the notion of ‘constitutive methodol-
ogy’ is the ways in which the book has been brought together and the kinds of questions it considers in the con-
stitutive chapters that make up the collection. Simply, through a systematic engagement with the book, I am not 
convinced that it applies itself sufficiently to decolonial questions. This concern aims to address a grave limitation 
of the book, but said limitation should not be seen as undermining the collective efforts of the book as there are 
some useful takeaways that assist the student of philosophy and literature (and/or literary theory) who is consid-
ering decolonial questions. My qualm lies in the obfuscating claim we find, ever so repeated, in the South African 
academe—this being the elusive nature of decolonisation and its meanings. In the case of African Philosophical and 
Literary Possibilities, this indefinability is seen as the lack of clarity vis-à-vis Africanisation. 
The editor sums this up as follows: “[w]hat precisely constitutes pedagogical, curriculum [Africanisation] 
remains unclear” (Phiri xiii). To interrupt myself and my critique, it might be useful to note that the editor does 
not say that decolonisation remains unclear—rather it is suggested that “[w]hat precisely constitutes pedagog-
ical, curriculum [Africanisation] remains unclear” (xiii, emphasis added). My critique, as detailed (even cursorily) 
above, might be misplaced, as I take issue with the obfuscation of decolonisation which is the sum-total of the 
movements we’ve witnessed in the country to date. What I am possibly pressing the editor for is an acknowledge-
ment of the distinctions that accrue to this sum-total that is decolonisation. Simply, while I acknowledge that 
my critique might be misplaced—an acknowledgement that is only extended to the extent that the editor should 
have anticipated this objection—were the objectives of the volume a serious and not merely a fashionable, and 
thus superficial, engagement with decoloniality, it would seem to me that the editor has conflated decolonisation 
with Africanisation. This conflation also elides the nuances of the decolonial tradition as developed by scholars of 
the Latin American school of thought, whose work has been immeasurably useful in the thinking of those situated 
in Africa who are treating similar questions and concerns. 
My request is that there be a clear distinction drawn by anyone who applies themselves to decolonisation, 
with respect to its historical course and its permutations. Such a distinction would recognise that the call for 
decolonisation in South Africa—which is a context that the editor and the contributors focus their attentions on, 
owing to the unprecedented student movements of 2015–2017—began in the years leading up to the democratic 
dispensation as a charge for the recognition of Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS; read ‘Africanisation’). Put 
simply, the first iteration was a call for Africanisation in the desire to include IKS as part of curricula and the pro-
cess of reimagining the university in South Africa at the dawn of democracy. This first iteration was constitutive 
of voices such as Mabogo More, whom the editor cites in her introduction, Mogobe Ramose, Kunene, and many 
others. The second iterative moment was the call for transformation, a matter that was systematically treated by 
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Lis Lange when she considered “Rethinking Transformation and its Knowledge(s)”. These two preceding mo-
ments gave us the rupture that was led by the student movements and became known as the demand for decoloni-
sation. Thus, to conflate Africanisation and decolonisation flattens the topography—while rendering the nuance 
that is constitutive of this area of scholarship mute—that makes up the oeuvre of Black/Indigenous intellectuals 
who have applied themselves (even in the English language, in recent years) to this question. To therefore claim 
that the meaning—or less pretentiously what is intended by the charge for decolonisation—is elusive, unclear, 
and undefined, smacks of curious arrogance(s) that are denotative of symbolic violence in the continued erasure 
of the writings of Black/Indigenous thinkers. It is useful to note, however, that this fact of recognition (a recogni-
tion of what I have termed ‘ontological legitimacy’) is taken up by Marzia Milazzo in chapter eight of the book. 
As a way of summing up the first entry point into the book, that is the ways in which the editor conceals and 
obfuscates their treatment of decolonisation by way of conflating it with Africanisation (a flattening of the topog-
raphy, as it were), we do get a generative take away from this blunder that is derivative of fashionable engagements 
with decolonisation. A superficial, yet positive take away, is the popularisation of decolonisation as a thematic 
area of engagement. The shortcomings with this approach, however, are a rendering of the movement—both in 
its theoretical and praxis-based analyses—as a vapid and empty signifier that continues the project of colonial 
violence, which was predicated on the erasure of native (Black/Indigenous) subjectivity. Such popularisations are 
what allow for the claim that ‘we don’t know what is intended by decolonisation’ not only to go unchallenged 
but to derive its substantiations in such concealments and ways of writing that continue the Culture of Letters in 
South Africa (as in the subtitle of Coetzee’s White Writing), a culture that was analysed and critiqued by Coetzee 
systematically for its part in the sustained infantilisation of Black/Indigenous subjectivity by white superiorist 
thinking. It is unclear to me whether this is an honest oversight or a very insidious and directed project at the 
systematic burial (concealment) of the knowledge produced by Black/Indigenous intellectuals of South Africa. 
More dangerously, however, is the derivative result that is the miseducation of the majority in the country. This 
is a continuance of colonial violence that is predicated in the claim that “knowledge is valid only insofar as it is 
developed by white scholars” (Kumalo, “Curriculating from the Black Archive—Marginality as Novelty” 111) and, 
more importantly, only insofar as it is developed in the English language. So, while the reader unperceptively sees 
value in the popularisation of decoloniality as discourse through fleeting engagements, the more attentive reader 
will flag a series of challenges that we get from the ways in which Phiri has chosen to frame her introduction to 
the text as a collective.
It seems apt here to quote a poem by Lebo Mashile, performed on 20 March 2021 in Newtown in Solidarity 
with the protesters who had been staging a sit in, led by Sibongile Mngoma:
Things that go unnamed, 
Wander through the world 
not knowing where to look, 
or where to go!
In Africa, Names are asked for,
Prayed for,
Blood is spilt in the name of NAMING!
Warm red liquid 
Seeping into dust
Fills the dead with life.
Our names are the dead speaking!
Ontological analyses as augmenting decolonial theory development
I now elect to take up, as promised, the consideration of ontology in a systematic and sustained manner, as it is 
engaged and treated in the collection. The more substantive and useful take away from the text is a sustained 
engagement with ontology which infuses the entire text and gives an impression of what was possibly intended 
in the book by the idea of a treatment of decolonial questions. This is to say that, in engaging the ways in which 
African literature(s) has treated African subjectivity, the book does indeed challenge the prevailing epistemo-
logical fads that are the invention of white supremacist thinking. In chapter one, and in considering the idea of 
philosophical method as inherently defined by disagreement, Oritsegbubemi Oyowe (3) suggests that the philos-
opher ought to be attentive to their immediate surroundings when he writes: “[the] above objection [the idea that 
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a philosopher betrays their disciplinary allegiance when they take up a position and defend that position while 
allowing room for disagreement] seems to me to originate from a rather poor grasp of what African philosophy is 
about and what African philosophers have been and are doing”. In this respect, Oyowe (5) takes the position that 
has been developed by a series of decolonial thinkers who contest the falsehoods of western philosophical tradi-
tions that ascribe to themselves the august function of considering universal questions when he writes, “[as] it 
turns out, the charge that doing philosophy with an African conscience will lead to the tribalization of philosophy 
is best levelled at Euro-American philosophers who fail to recognize other traditions of thought”. 
This framework as developed by Oyowe seeks to suggest that there is an inherent value in paying attention 
to the ways in which African philosophers treat the harsh phenomenological realities that define the lives of Af-
ricans and that this attention should not be viewed as some parochial application in how it functions to dislodge 
the centrality of Eurocentric considerations in an African context. In demonstrating the usefulness of paying 
attention to how Africans have treated continuing questions that define the human condition, in chapter three 
Hull pays attention to three fictional texts developed by Africans. Two of these are done by Black/Indigenous 
intellectuals/literati: S. E. K. Mqhayi’s Ityala Lamawele (1914) and A. C. Jordan’s The Wrath of the Ancestors (1940) 
respectively, with the third text being J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace (1999). The idea is that these two disciplines (i.e., 
philosophy and literary studies) are generatively compatible, specifically when we assume the position that “val-
ue conflict is an area where philosophical theory and creative fiction can helpfully inform one another” (Hull 33). 
The ontological focus here, as per my own reading, is highlighted when we consider the historical factuality 
of colonialism (read colonisation), which is a matter that Blackness/Indigeneity had to confront; and by ‘confront’ 
I mean a reality with which we had to contend as a matter of survival. In confronting this violence there was and 
continues to be the reality of competing modes of life, the first of which is predicated on Black/Indigenous ontolo-
gy and our ways of understanding the world, and another being this imposition that is critiqued by Oyowe. What 
Hull showcases for the reader by conducting his analysis using the works of Mqhayi and Jordan—as the first two 
conceptual moves in developing his argument—is that Blackness/Indigeneity applied itself to these competing 
ways of life (a matter that is still the case to this very day, seen in the very fact of language that I discussed as my 
entry point into this review article). To demonstrate the historicity of this application, I invite the reader to con-
sider the composition we find in William Wellington Gqoba’s (148) sustained treatment of the role and function 










When we were independent, 
responsible for our governance, 
there were no pounds for stray stock, 
there were no tolls, no passes. 
We left them alone, we welcomed them, 
they cut down trees, cursing you, 
they tilled and worked their land, 
possessed pastures of their own
and we for our part had ours. (Gqoba 149)
I draw the reader’s attention to this matter as a way of demonstrating that there has always been a sustained 
consideration of the effects of colonialism and coloniality, which focuses the matter of constant compromise 
that Hull writes about. Pointedly, the aim lies in demonstrating that, owing to colonial violence and as a matter 
of securing our survival (as Black/Indigenous people), the matter of compromise has been considered by and is a 
constitutive part of Black ontology for at least 200 years now. At a secondary level, my demonstration here seeks 
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to undergird Oyowe’s critique of the totalising effects of western philosophical traditions that assumed centre 
stage and styled (even to this day) themselves as the intellectual traditions that are most worthy of study. This 
demonstration underscores the usefulness in locating the two disciplines (philosophy and African literary study) 
in conversation with each other. 
While Hull’s chapter is integral to shoring up the decolonial understanding (which is informed by the two 
recent treatises of decolonisation as intellectual tradition, i.e., Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s Epistemic Freedom in Africa 
and the collection Decolonisation as Democratisation edited by myself) in the text, he commits a grave ontological 
misrecognition in his translation of the names of Mqhayi’s characters in Ityala Lamawele. The reader might inquire 
as to why I stake such a strong claim. My objection is predicated on the function of naming, in what can be un-
derstood as Black ontology (but what we can zero in on, as Xhosa ways of naming, in the case of Ityala Lamawele). 
This is to say that names are sacred and central, and their meaning ought not to be translated but can possibly be 
interpreted. To demonstrate the point, I draw the reader’s attention to Kunene once again when he writes, “[yet], 
it was always with a certain sense of seriousness that my father discussed with me the genealogy of our Royal 
Clan, the histories of past wars, and the general truths of our African philosophy and values” (28). Kunene does 
not come to attach these three components (i.e., the genealogy of the Royal Clan, histories of past wars, and the 
general truths of African philosophy and values) without unjustified understanding. It is for this reason that I use 
his work to elaborate on the point. The function of the genealogy of the Royal Clan demonstrates the point raised 
by Coetzee in his observation of an ‘Adamic language’ (9), “in which Africa will naturally express itself, that is to 
say, a language in which there is no split between signifier and signified, and things are their names”. An Adamic 
language is subsequently evinced in Kumalo’s (“Defining an African Vocabulary for the Exploration of Possibil-
ities in Higher Education”) analysis of the role of names and their functionality in the context of kwaBulawayo in 
Zimbabwe wherein kwaBulawayo becomes ‘the place of death’ (in the literal translation), owing to the actions of 
Mzilikazi in his establishment of the Ndebele royal house in Zimbabwe and in the erection of isizwe sika Mthwakazi. 
In this example, the reader is privy to the challenge of translating names, specifically in a case where a name, as 
rigid designator, is derived from the clan names of the named subject. A translation in such a context misses the 
nuances of history as attached to that name—and the subsequent significance of that name within the broader 
“genealogy of the Royal Clan” as Kunene indicates.
As example, consider this phrase, “Wele’s complaint has already been heard in the court of his local headman, 
Lucangwana (meaning ‘small door’)” (Hull 35, emphasis added). The reasons behind an objection of the translation 
of our names are manyfold but I will pay attention to only two as a way of demonstrating the point. In the first 
instance, our names might be derived from our clan name’s praise poetry (which is a mode of encoding history by 
way of inflecting historical events with the names of those whose actions are worthy of being remembered). In 
this case, the name “Lucangwana” might have been given to the character as a way of recognising or informing his 
moral character within the broader scheme of his lineage and ancestry. To translate the name as “small door” (35) 
misreads and ontologically obliterates the context in which said name is given, while side-stepping the complex-
ity that is engineered by Mqhayi in his composition and writing of the dramatic novel. Moreover, it undermines 
the philosophical nuance that is embedded in the meaning-making processes through naming, a process that is 
bound-up with how we (Blackness/Indigeneity) understand being as it relates to the world; an understanding 
that is mediated by our names and how they inform our moral character as named beings. 
The second matter is to say that the name (Lucangwana) might be given as a way of remembering an histor-
ical event that is synonymous with the birth of the person—in this case, the character as developed by Mqhayi. 
The objection holds again, as per the explanation given above, which is to say that in translating the name the 
translator not only disrespects but completely erases the very being of the person whose name is translated, as 
said translation (as Hull does in chapter three) does not adequately account for these possibilities that are only 
accessible if the reader is conversant with the linguistic textile that informs Mqhayi’s composition. It is for this 
reason that Kunene gives language such a central focus, exclaiming—even—that this language has been the cause 
of the death of our ancestors. It is useful to note that said deaths are not only physical but are connotative of these 
forms of death that are inscribed through ontological misrecognitions. 
The salvaging chapter—salvaging in the sense of an adequate engagement with Black ontology—to the ex-
tent that the treatment is deferentially sustained, is Milazzo’s chapter eight, which is also the final chapter in the 
book. Analysing Miriam Tlali’s Between Two Worlds (originally published as Muriel at the Metropolitan, 1975), Milazzo 
demonstrates and traces the historicity of the continued disregard of writing developed by Black/Indigenous 
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intellectuals in our context. This dismissal is framed most starkly in these ways by Milazzo (133): “one would be 
hard-pressed to find Tlali’s work taught in philosophy courses, despite the fact that Black South African fiction 
provides invaluable lenses through which students can grapple with pressing social and ethical issues”. This 
assertion serves two functions, which is possibly another reason why I frame the chapter as a salvaging chapter 
in the book. The first function is to overtly state the aims of decolonisation as it pertains to the higher education 
sector of South Africa, which the editor sets out to engage, but the book functions as an inadequate treatment 
of—at least, explicitly. This decolonial engagement is found in chapter eight in the way Milazzo (133) confronts 
the project of curriculum revision, which remains unattained owing to how “[white] supremacy […] continues to 
be a collective affair and operate[s] in ways that testify to the significance of Biko and Tlali’s works for grappling 
with the current racial moment”. Additionally, “[despite] a growing proliferation of criticism on South African 
writing, Black South African literature across genres and time periods remains chronically understudied” (134). 
This observation underscores the question I posed with my inquiry into the possibility of whether said conceal-
ment is a directed effort at the continued relegation of scholarship developed by Black/Indigenous intellectuals in 
our context. From the argument we find in Milazzo’s chapter, the answer to my question might be in agreement 
with the latter position, that this is indeed an insidious and directed affront that aims at the orchestrated con-
cealment of Black/Indigenous thought. In this way, the book lives up to a very ambitious promise—at least one of 
them—as set out by the editor, which is an analysis that attempts to explore the possibilities of locating literature 
and philosophy in conversation. 
The fulfilment of this promise is seen in how, through such an act of locating the two disciplines in conver-
sation, we unearth persistent challenges that necessitate the decolonial project in our context. While the book 
could have done more to overtly indicate how it is addressing decolonial questions so as to not render itself the 
target of such criticism(s)—a matter that possibly might have required more tactful editorial curation—it does 
nonetheless shore up the areas that still require our collective attentions as a way of adequately responding to the 
fundamental request that was staked by the students of #MustFall movements who were begging to be seen in 
a system that ought to, in principle, serve them in their context and not some myopic agenda that continues to 
valorise Eurocentric notions of what it means to read at a university. 
The instruction in this respect, that is to say how we create an African university that is responsive to Afri-
can problems, is gleaned in the advisory analysis we get from chapter five as penned by Pier Paolo Frassinelli and 
Lisa Treffry-Goatley. In an argument that adequately eschews the rigid conception of the Digital Humanities in 
Africa (or the African Digital Humanities), Frassinelli and Treffry-Goatley demonstrate how the democratisa-
tion of access to knowledge (a democratisation that happens by way of the younger generation engaging with 
literature in a mixed media format on their smart devices) can be seen as a subversive move that works towards 
decolonial ends. Again, this is an implicit connection that the reader is forced to make of their own volition, a 
connection that the reader comes to make as a result of being conversant with decolonial struggles and debates. 
Overall, the reader must come to African Philosophical and Literary Possibilities as an informed student of decoloniality 
and decolonial theory as the collective tapestry—in the form of most of the chapters that make up the book—does 
not apply itself to treating, with sufficient attention, the requisite conceptual connecting dots that show us how 
this book contributes to decolonial debates as they have been developed in the South African university. 
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